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RADICAL SCEPTICISM, EPISTEMIC LUCK AND EPISTEMIC VALUE 
 
 
Duncan Pritchard 
University of Edinburgh 
 
 
ABSTRACT. It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism 
through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical 
scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and 
that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has 
important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy. 
 
 
0. Suppose we take it as a starting-point in our dealings with radical sceptical arguments that 
they are trying to demonstrate that the epistemic standing in question which, they claim, is 
unavailable to usknowledge, typicallyis an epistemic standing that is of distinctive value. 
This is a sensible enough working assumption, after all, since if the epistemic standing that is, 
it seems, snatched from us by the (successful) radical sceptical argument is not of special 
value, then it is hard to see why anyone should particularly care. Put another way, if the 
epistemic standing in question is not distinctively valuable, then why is our response to the 
sceptical argument not simply a resigned shrug? 
On the face of it, such a working assumption may seem pretty benign, since we tend 
to take it for granted that the targets of radical sceptical arguments are indeed of special value 
to us. Suppose, however, that it could be demonstrated that the relevant epistemic standing is 
not of distinctive value, what then? As it happens, I am suspicious of the idea that knowledge 
simpliciter is distinctively valuable (at least in the way that we typically suppose), and I will 
sketch why I think this in a moment. Accordingly, this issue looms large for me. What I 
propose to explore here is how such a perspective on the value of knowledge impacts on our 
understanding of the radical sceptical argument. More generally, I want to argue that 
considerations about epistemic value can potentially have important ramifications for the 
debate regarding radical scepticism. 
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1. Following most contemporary epistemologists, I will take radical scepticism to be 
primarily concerned with knowledge. Such scepticism has been formulated in various ways, 
but the overarching formulation in recent times has been along the lines of the following 
template, where ‘E’ is some ‘everyday’ proposition (i.e., a proposition which we all tend to 
think that we know, such as that one has two hands), and ‘SH’ is a radical sceptical 
hypothesis which is logically inconsistent with the everyday proposition (e.g., that one is a 
brain in a vat (BIV)): 
 
The Template Radical Sceptical Argument 
(S1) S does not know not: SH. 
(S2) If S does not know not: SH, then S does not know E. 
(SC) S does not know E.1 
 
The motivation for the first premise concerns the fact that there is, so the argument goes at 
any rate, nothing available to us to indicate that we are not the victims of a radical sceptical 
hypothesis. Since, for example, my experience of being a BIV who merely seems to have two 
hands would be subjectively indistinguishable from my experience of actually having two 
hands in normal circumstances, the thought goes that one cannot possibly know that one is 
not envatted. The same goes for other radical sceptical hypotheses. 
 The motivation for the second premise comes from the ‘closure’ principle for 
knowledge, which we can formulate as follows: 
 
The Closure Principle for Knowledge 
If S knows that p, and S competently deduces q from p (thereby coming to believe q while retaining 
her knowledge that p), then S knows that q.2 
 
This principle is clearly highly intuitive. Moreover, given that we can legitimately suppose 
that any reasonably reflective agent is at least in a position to know the relevant entailment 
once prompted (i.e., that the target E-type proposition entails the target not-SH-type 
proposition), it follows from closure that our inability to know the denials of sceptical 
hypotheses is able to undermine our putative knowledge of E-type propositions. Indeed, 
given that the epistemic standing of our belief in just about any E-type proposition can be 
threatened in this wayone would just need to vary the sceptical hypothesis to suitit 
follows that radical scepticism quickly ensues.  
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 We thus have two highly intuitive premises as part of a valid argument which 
generates a sceptical conclusion. Given that the sceptical conclusion is so counterintuitive, 
what we have on our hands is thus a paradox. 
 
 
2. There are various ways of responding to this argument. One approach, advanced by Fred 
Dretske (1970) and Robert Nozick (1981) amongst others, is to block the argument by 
denying the closure principle. Given the intuitive nature of this principle, however, this is 
more easily said than done, and this proposal has since fallen into disfavour. Accordingly, I 
won’t explore it further here.3 With closure intact, howeverat least in a form in which it 
can appropriately support (S2) of the sceptical argumentthe options for evading radical 
scepticism of this sort become rather limited. Indeed, a few complications aside, I think most 
would now agree that the premise in the sceptical argument that needs to be denied is (S1).4 
The anti-sceptical position that results is one that we might broadly call ‘Moorean’.5 
 There are various ways of defending a Moorean anti-sceptical strategy, some more 
concessive to the sceptic than others. For example, at one end of the spectrum of 
concessiveness, one might argue that one has merely a standing entitlement to believe in the 
denials of sceptical hypotheses, even though one lacks any specific grounds to epistemically 
support such belief.6 Alternatively, at the other end of the spectrum, one might argue that one 
has factive epistemic support in favour of one’s belief in this regard, such that the epistemic 
support one has for this belief actually entails the target proposition.7 One could also be more 
or less concessive to scepticism along a different axis in terms of the extent to which one 
wishes to accommodate our sceptical intuitionsin particular, our intuition, at least in 
contexts in which the problem of scepticism is under discussion, that there is something right 
about scepticism. One concessive option in this regard is to adopt some form of 
contextualism and so argue that in certain contexts what the sceptic claims is true.8 Still, the 
point remains that while there are a myriad of anti-sceptical approaches in play here, the step 
in the radical sceptical argument above that is ultimately objected to is (S1).  
Moreover, notice that the concession to the sceptic that all Moorean anti-sceptical 
strategies make is to allow that agents are unable to distinguish between everyday 
experiences and the sort of sceptical experiences that would be generated by being the victim 
of a (relevant) sceptical hypothesis. So even if one argues that we do have adequate evidence 
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in favour of our beliefs in the denials of sceptical hypotheses, one still faces the task of 
treading the delicate path of endorsing this claim while nonetheless conceding that agents 
lack the relevant discriminatory powers.  
Of course, one might be tempted to take the heroic option here of maintaining that 
there is nothing more to telling the difference between two scenarios than knowing that the 
one scenario has obtained rather than the other. After all, with closure in play, it will follow 
on the Moorean view that one does know both the E-type and the not-SH-type proposition. 
For example, one will know that one has hands and that one is not envatted, and thus that one 
has hands rather than being handlessly envatted. The temptation, then, is to maintain that one 
can tell the difference between having hands and being a handless BIV after all, since one is 
able to know that the one possibility has obtained and the other hasn’t. I take it that this sort 
of claim will not stand up to closer scrutiny, however, attractive though it may be given the 
potential theoretical pay-off involved.  
In order to see this, forget about scepticism for a moment and consider instead an 
apparently normal situation in which one is at home with one’s children. Suppose now that 
someone raises the error possibility that you are not at home with your children at all, but are 
instead sitting next to extremely life-like robots pretending to be your children who were 
substituted a few moments ago when you were temporarily distracted. Given everything that 
you know about the plausibility of this scenario, you are surely in a position to rationally 
dismiss it. Indeed, once you have rationally formed a view as to why you are entitled to 
dismiss this error-possibility we would describe your epistemic situation as being one in 
which (i) you know that the persons before you are your children, and (ii) you know that the 
persons before you are not extremely life-like robots. In short, you know that it is your 
children who are before you rather than extremely life-like robots.  
Still, all this is entirely compatible with the idea that were there to be extremely life-
like robots before you, you wouldn’t be able to tell the difference. That is, your belief in this 
regard is insensitiveviz., you would continue to believe that it is your children before you in 
such a scenario even though what you are in fact looking at are life-like robots. After all, your 
grounds in support of your knowledge that it is your children before you rather than 
extremely life-like robots need have nothing to do with whether you can tell the difference 
between the two, but would in all likelihood instead concern other factorsas noted above, it 
would probably just concern your grounded judgement of the plausibility of this scenario 
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given the background information available to you. Moreover, given the implausibility of the 
error possibility in question, we surely wouldn’t insist that you should have specific grounds 
to dismiss it in order to know that you are looking at your children. We wouldn’t require, for 
example, that you should examine your children closely to ensure that they aren’t life-like 
robots (run a Turing test on them, say). 
There is thus more to being able to tell the difference between two competing 
scenarios than simply knowing that the one scenario has obtained rather than the other.9 With 
this in mind, one should resist the temptation of arguing that because on the anti-sceptical 
approach which denies (S1) one is able to know both the E-type proposition and the denial of 
the SH-type proposition that one can thereby perform the incredible feat of being able to tell 
the difference between normal experiences and their sceptical counterparts.   
 
 
3. I noted above that I am suspicious of the idea that knowledge simpliciter is distinctively 
valuable, at least in the way that we typically suppose. I think it is pretty clear that we 
instinctively regard knowledge as distinctively valuable. If this were not the case, then it 
would be mysterious why so much of our epistemological theorising unhesitatingly focuses 
on knowledge rather than on other lesser epistemic standings. Moreover, various thought-
experiments also lend support to this claim. For example, suppose you were faced with the 
choice between knowing a proposition and, say, merely truly believing it. Suppose further 
that it is stipulated in advance that there will be no practical implications resting on your 
decision.  Still, wouldn’t you prefer to have knowledge? 
The latter observation in particular suggests that the way in which we instinctively 
value knowledge is as something which is good in its own right, regardless of any additional 
instrumental value it might have. That is, what makes knowledge distinctively valuable, on 
this view, is that it is non-instrumentally, or finally, valuable. Furthermore, notice that if it is 
right that knowledgeunlike lesser epistemic standings, like reliably-formed beliefis 
finally valuable in this way then this would surely explain why we unhesitatingly focus on 
knowledge in our epistemological theorising, rather than on other epistemic standings. After 
all, whereas these other epistemic standings may be of great instrumental value, it is only 
when we get to the epistemic standing picked out by knowledge that we have something 
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which is good in its own right. Put another way, the difference in value between knowledge 
and lesser epistemic standings is a difference in kind, and not merely a difference in degree. 
In contrast, if knowledge were just instrumentally valuable then it is hard to see how 
this could explain the way in which we instinctively value knowledge. For example, one 
might have a picture on which knowledge lay on a continuum of instrumental epistemic 
value, with lesser epistemic standings generally enjoying lesser degrees of instrumental value 
and more enhanced epistemic standings generally enjoying greater degrees of epistemic 
value. On this ‘continuum’ picture of the value of knowledge, however, it is mysterious why 
we should fixate on the particular point on the continuum that knowledge marks out, rather 
than, say, a point just before or just after.  
The value that we intuitively attach to knowledge is thus final value, a final value that 
lesser epistemic standings lack.10  
 
 
4. Of course, that we treat something as finally valuable does not mean that we are right to do 
so (think, for example, of the miser). The question, then, is whether we are right to finally 
valuable knowledge in the way that we do. I am inclined to think not.  
I know of only one proposal in the literature that is able to offer a good argument for 
why knowledge is finally valuable. This is the virtue-theoretic account of the value of 
knowledge which gains its clearest expression in recent work by John Greco (e.g., 2002; 
2007; forthcominga; forthcomingb). Essentially, Greco argues that once we understand 
knowledge along virtue-theoretic lines then we see that knowledgeunlike lesser epistemic 
standingsis a form of achievement and thus, like achievements more generally, is 
something that is valuable in its own right.11  
There are two claims in play here. The first, which we will call the final value thesis, 
is that achievements are finally valuable. The second, which we will call the achievement 
thesis, is that knowledge, unlike lesser epistemic standings, is a form of achievement. If both 
theses can be adequately defended, then that would suffice to support the claim that 
knowledge is distinctively valuable in the sense that the difference in value between 
knowledge and that which falls short of knowledge is a matter of kind and not merely degree. 
Both theses are, in fact, highly plausible, at least once they are understood in the right 
way. Greco understands achievements to be successes that are because of ability, where the 
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‘because of’ relation is to be read in causal explanatory termsi.e., roughly, that the ability is 
the best explanation of the success. This certainly seems right. Consider an archerlet’s call 
him ‘Archie’taking aim at a target and successfully hitting the target. Suppose, however, 
that Archie lacks any relevant archery abilities, such that his success was simply down to 
luck. In such a case we would not regard Archie’s success as being because of his ability 
because he lacks the relevant ability. Equally, we would not regard his success as an 
achievement.  
Interestingly, the same goes even if Archie has the relevant ability and is also 
successful but where the success is not appropriately related toi.e., is not because ofhis 
ability. Suppose, for example, that Archie’s success is ‘gettierized’, as would happen, for 
instance, if a freak gust of wind blew his arrow off-course but then a second freak gust of 
wind blew it back on course again. Even though in this case there is the conjunction of 
success and ability, the success clearly does not constitute an achievement, and the natural 
explanation for this is that the success is not because of the ability. 
The idea that achievements should be understood as successes that are because of 
ability thus has a great deal to commend it. With achievements so construed, however, it is 
likewise plausible to suppose that achievements are finally valuable. In order to see this, 
suppose that the practical benefits of successfully hitting the target are exactly the same 
regardless of whether or not the success in question is because of one’s ability (and so a bona 
fide achievement). Nevertheless, wouldn’t one prefer to be successful because of one’s ability 
rather than because of luck? Given that the instrumental value at issue is the same either way, 
it follows that the greater value we attribute to achievements in such a case reflects a 
judgement on our part that achievements are finally valuable in a way that successes which 
fall short of achievements are not. Moreover, there seems no good reason why we shouldn’t 
take this commonsense judgment about the value of achievements at face-value. 
The final value thesis thus looks compelling, at first pass at least. What about the 
achievement thesis? Here is where the virtue-theoretic element of the proposal comes to the 
fore, for virtue epistemologists like Greco argue that knowledge is to be understood as 
cognitive success (i.e., true belief) that is because of cognitive ability (i.e., intellectual virtue, 
broadly conceived). Most epistemologists will agree that there must be some ability 
component to knowledge, since cognitive success that is unrelated to one’s abilityand so 
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just down to luckwould clearly not constitute knowledge. What is distinctive about this 
proposal, however, is that it in effect exclusively defines knowledge in terms of ability, in 
that it argues that once the relationship between cognitive ability and cognitive success is 
understood correctlyin terms of the ‘because of’ relationthere is no need to introduce any 
further epistemic component into one’s analysis of knowledge.12  
One can see the appeal of such a proposal by considering how it deals with standard 
Gettier-style cases. After all, such cases tend to involve agents who exhibit the relevant 
cognitive ability, and who are in addition cognitively successful, and yet who nonetheless 
lack knowledge because the cognitive success in question is not because of their cognitive 
ability. Imagine, for example, a farmer looking into a field who, by using her highly reliable 
perceptual faculties, comes to believe that there is a sheep in the field because she sees a 
sheep-shaped object there. Suppose further that she is cognitively successful in this regard, in 
that there really is a sheep in the field. Finally, however, suppose that the success is 
gettierized in the sense that what the farmer is in fact looking at is a big hairy dog which 
looks just like a sheep, and which is obscuring from view the real sheep in the field. We 
would not class such a success as a cognitive achievement, nor would we class it as 
knowledge.13 For Greco, the reason why is the same in both cases: the cognitive success in 
question is not because of the agent’s cognitive ability but is instead merely down to luck. 
There is thus also a great deal of intuitive support for the achievement thesis as well. 
With both theses in play, the virtue-theoretic account of the distinctive value of knowledge 
seems to have much to commend it: knowledge, like achievements more generally, is rightly 
regarded as distinctively valuable because it is finally valuable. 
 
 
5. Unfortunately, on closer inspection this proposal does not hold water. I think that many 
will probably find the final value thesis to be the weaker of the two claims in play here, on 
account of how there do seem to be some achievementssuch as achievements which are 
very easy, or trivial, or just plain wickedwhich are not valuable at all, much less finally 
valuable. This problem is, however, tractable, for notice that the claim is only that successes 
qua achievements are finally valuable. In particular, it is not part of the view that the overall 
(ultima facie) value of a success that constitutes an achievement should be particularly great.  
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 To illustrate this point, consider the case of a trivial cognitive achievement. Suppose, 
for example, that one devotes one’s time to pointlessly counting the pebbles on a beach, a 
task at which one is very successful. Now one might say that on this view there is nothing 
stopping such trivial successes counting as achievements, and thus as accruing final value. 
But notice that there is nothing problematic in itself about supposing that a trivial success, 
qua achievement, is finally valuable. The problem only emerges once one further supposes 
that if a success is finally valuable then it has a high overall value. This conditional, however, 
is false; indeed, cases like that of the trivial cognitive achievement represent clear 
counterexamples. After all, given the fact that the instrumental value of this success will 
inevitably be negligible, and given further that the opportunity cost of engaging in such an 
endeavour will almost certainly be very highthereby generating quite a lot of disvalueit 
follows that the overall value of this success will be very low (perhaps even negative), even 
despite the fact that it generates some final value.  
 Accordingly, I don’t think the problem with the virtue-theoretic account of the value 
of knowledge lies with the final value thesis, at least once that thesis is understood 
correctly.14 Instead, I think the real weak point for this proposal lies with the achievement 
thesis. In particular, on closer analysis it turns out that knowledge is not a cognitive 
achievement at all. This is because one can possess knowledge without exhibiting a cognitive 
achievement, and exhibit a cognitive achievement while lacking knowledge. 
 Cases of the former are easy to come by, but the most straightforward cases concern 
testimonial knowledge. Consider an example put forward by Jennifer Lackey (2007), albeit to 
illustrate a slightly different point. Imagine someone getting off the train in an unfamiliar city 
and asking the first person she meets for directions to a local landmark. Suppose that the 
person our hero speaks to has first-hand knowledge of the area and communicates this 
information to our agent who promptly forms a true belief about the right way to go. Unless 
we know an awful lot less than we think we do, then we often gain testimonial knowledge in 
this fashion. Notice, however, that we wouldn’t say that it is because of our agent’s cognitive 
abilities that she is cognitive successfuli.e., that the explanation for her cognitive success is 
specifically her cognitive abilities. (We might say that it is because of her informant’s 
cognitive abilities that she is successful, but that’s a different matter). Testimonial knowledge 
of this sort, then, seems to be available even in the absence of a cognitive achievement. 
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 It’s worth spending a little time explaining exactly what the point being made here is. 
In particular, it is not being denied that our hero is exercising relevant cognitive abilities in 
this case, such that her cognitive abilities are playing some role in that success. We would 
expect her to be appropriately sensitive to potential defeaters, for example, such as an 
informant displaying body language which would indicate that she was not trustworthy. The 
point is only that such cases illustrate that one can gain knowledge by exhibiting a cognitive 
success which is not best explained in terms of one’s own cognitive ability (and which is thus 
not because of that cognitive ability). There is thus sometimes less to knowledge than 
cognitive achievement. 
Significantly, there is also sometimes more to knowledge than a cognitive 
achievement too. In order to see this, consider again the case of Archie described above. This 
time, though, imagine that Archie selects his target from a range of potential targets entirely 
at random before skilfully firing his arrow and hitting the target. Let us stipulate that the 
success here is not subject to Gettier-style luck, in that nothing intervenes between the ability 
and the success, such as the two freak gusts of wind which fortuitously cancel each other out 
that were described above. Nevertheless, the success is lucky because, unbeknownst to 
Archie, all of the other targets that he could have fired at contained forcefields which would 
usually repel arrows. Fortunately, Archie just happened to fire at the one target that lacked 
such a forcefield. His success is thus lucky in the sense that he could very easily have been 
unsuccessful.  
 Interestingly, however, I take it that we have a strong intuition in this case that even 
though the success in question is lucky, this does not prevent Archie from exhibiting a 
genuine achievement. Indeed, we would naturally say that his successhis hitting of the 
targetis because of his skills at archery. What this highlights is that there are two distinct 
ways in which a success could be lucky, only one of which is incompatible with 
achievements. On the one hand, there is the kind of luck found in Gettier-style cases in which 
something intervenes between the ability and the success to ensure that the success is not 
because of the ability. On the other hand, there is the kind of ‘environmental’ luck which 
does not intervene between ability and success in this way but rather simply reflects some 
unfortunate feature of the environment which would usually prevent success but which does 
not do so in this case. Environmental luck, it turns out, is compatible with genuine 
achievements, unlike Gettier-style luck. 
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The importance of this distinction between two types of luck and their relationship to 
achievements becomes apparent once one considers the epistemological analogue of the 
above case. Indeed, the famous ‘barn façade’ example is structurally analogous to the case 
involving Archie just described. In particular, unlike a standard Gettier-style case, such as 
that involving the farmer described above, in the barn façade case nothing intervenes between 
the agent’s cognitive ability and her cognitive success. She really does see a barn after all 
(and not, say, something that merely looks like a barn but which is obscuring from view a 
genuine barn, or something like that). Nevertheless, the agent’s belief is still lucky in the 
sense that she could very easily have been mistaken. The luck in question is thus 
environmental luck. Had the agent been looking at any other barn-shaped object in the area 
then she would have formed a false belief; it is just fortunate that despite the epistemically 
unfriendly nature of the environment, she happens nonetheless to be cognitively successful. 
Moreover, notice that just as in the Archie case involving environmental luck where we are 
inclined to say that a genuine achievement is being exhibited, similarly there seems no reason 
why we should deny that the agent in this case is not exhibiting a genuine cognitive 
achievement. Wouldn’t we say that her cognitive success is because of her cognitive 
abilities? Even so, she lacks knowledge. 
The moral is that there is sometimes more to knowledge than exhibiting a cognitive 
achievement, and I suggest that this point has been overlooked by proponents of the virtue-
theoretic proposal because they have failed to notice the distinction between Gettier-style and 
environmental epistemic luck (indeed, between Gettier-style and environmental luck more 
generally). 
 
 
6. Now I don’t want to deny that there are moves available to someone like Greco when it 
comes to responding to these problems. He could insist, for example, that the testimonial case 
described above is an example in which the agent’s knowledge does reflect a cognitive 
achievement, and thus deny our intuitions in this case. Equally, he could also argue that there 
are relevant disanalogies between the Archer case and the barn façade case which can enable 
him to resist the conclusion that a cognitive achievement is exhibited in the latter situation 
even though an achievement is exhibited in the former. And, indeed, there are other potential 
moves available. 
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Space prevents me from exploring these responses here.15 In any case, the line of 
argument put forward in the last section is not meant to constitute a knockdown argument 
against the view anyway. Rather the point of this argument is to show that intuition in fact 
points towards a very different conception of knowledge, one on which knowledge and 
cognitive achievements come apart (in both directions).16  
If the above line of argument is accepted then it should become clear why I am 
suspicious about the kind of distinctive value that we tend to ascribe to knowledge. Assuming 
that no further argument can be supplied in defence of the thesis that knowledge is finally 
valuable, then it seems that all we are entitled to suppose is that cognitive achievement, an 
epistemic standing which can fall short of knowledge, is finally valuable. But if that’s right, 
then there is nothing particularly special about knowledge; in particular, knowledge is not 
more valuable, as a matter of kind and not merely degree, than that which falls short of 
knowledge. 
In what follows, I will take it as given that no further argument in defence of the final 
value of knowledge is available, and thus conclude that the failure of the virtue-theoretic 
defence of the final value of knowledge entails that knowledge is not finally valuable. 
Moreover, I will also take it as given that cognitive achievements are finally valuable. I will 
then explore what consequences these two claims have for the problem of radical scepticism.  
 
 
7. As explained there, the standard way to resolve the radical sceptical argument is by 
arguingin a broadly ‘Moorean’ fashionthat we are able to know the denials of sceptical 
hypotheses after all, even though we are unable to distinguish between ordinary 
circumstances and the corresponding sceptical scenario. Given that we grant that knowledge 
is not distinctively valuable in the manner that we pre-theoretically suppose, the interesting 
question we now need to ask is whether the success of such a Moorean anti-sceptical strategy 
would ensure that we have thereby rescued from the sceptic’s grasp a distinctively valuable 
epistemic standing. In particular, assuming the success of the Moorean strategy, is the kind of 
knowledge that is preserved potentially of the distinctively valuable sort such that it involves 
genuine cognitive achievement? 
 We can get a better handle on what is at issue here by reformulating the template 
sceptical argument outlined above specifically in terms of a type of knowledge which 
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essentially involves cognitive achievementlet’s call it ‘knowledge+’and considering 
each of the reformulated premises in turn. Here, then, is the new version of the sceptical 
argument: 
 
The Template Radical Sceptical Argument Reformulated 
(S1+) S does not know+ not: SH. 
(S2+) If S does not know+ not: SH, then S does not know+ E. 
(SC+) S does not know+ E. 
 
The crux of the matter is that such an argument still has the potential to pose a worrisome 
sceptical challenge, since while its conclusion is consistent with our having widespread 
knowledge of E-type propositions, it nevertheless has the capacity to generate a form of 
scepticism which deprives us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us. 
In order to give the Moorean approach the best run for its money, let us grant for the 
sake of argument the most robust form of Mooreanism availablei.e., the view that our 
knowledge, even of the denials of sceptical hypotheses, is typically supported by factive 
grounds. With this in mind, let us examine first the plausibility of (S1+).  
Given the form of Mooreanism in play, there are certainly good grounds for 
supposing that the agent in question is able to know that she is not the victim of a sceptical 
hypothesis. In normal circumstances, there can be no question that the truth of the target 
beliefi.e., that one is not the victim of a sceptical hypothesisis not a matter of luck. After 
all, in such circumstances a belief of this sort could not very easily be false, since an awful lot 
would need to change about the world in order to ensure the falsity of this belief. 
Accordingly, it is plausible to suppose that whatever anti-luck condition one imposed on 
one’s theory of knowledge would be met.17 Moreover, if the belief is supported by factive 
grounds, then we ought to be able to allow that this belief would satisfy other constraints we 
might want to lay down on knowledge possession. The belief would surely be adequately 
supported by evidence, for example. There is thus a strong prima facie case for agreeing with 
the robust Moorean that one can know the denials of sceptical hypotheses.  
Nevertheless, since we have already seen that one can have knowledge without 
thereby exhibiting a cognitive achievementand that it is cognitive achievements which are 
distinctively valuablethat the conditions for knowledge are satisfied does not ensure that 
the kind of knowledge in question is distinctively valuable. In short, it does not ensure that 
one has knowledge+, which is the kind of knowledge specifically at issue in (S1+). 
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Moreover, there is every reason for supposing that the kind of knowledge in play here is not 
knowledge+. For recall, in order to exhibit a cognitive achievement the truth of one’s belief 
needs to because of the exercise of one’s relevant cognitive abilities. It is, however, wholly 
unintuitive to suppose that the truth of an agent’s belief that she is not, say, a BIV is because 
of her cognitive ability (even if we are willing to grant that her cognitive ability plays some 
substantive role in this cognitive success). Indeed, if anything, it seems that the cognitive 
success in question here is more creditable to the good fortune of being in an epistemically 
friendly environment than it is to the agent’s cognitive abilities.  
That we lack the relevant discriminatory abilities is key to understanding why this is 
so. If one is unable to discriminate between ordinary scenarios and sceptical scenarios, and 
one is in addition unable to rationally adduce independent epistemic support in favour of the 
target belief, then it can hardly be the case that one’s cognitive success when one believes 
truly that one is not the victim of a sceptical hypothesis is because of one’s own cognitive 
ability.  
This claim requires some development, and part of the reason for this is that one 
might think that whether or not this is so depends on the kind of Moorean proposal in 
question. That is, one might argue that provided one’s Mooreanism is of the robust type that 
we are interested in, such that it allows that one’s beliefs in the denials of sceptical 
hypotheses could be supported by factive grounds, then there is no reason to deny that one’s 
cognitive success in such a case is because of one’s cognitive ability. 
In order to explore this issue it will be helpful to return to the example given in §2 
which was meant to illustrate that one can have better evidence for believing that one 
scenario has obtained rather than an alternative scenario, and thereby for knowing that the 
one scenario has obtained rather than the alternative scenario, even though one cannot 
discriminate between the two scenarios.18 The example I offered concerned being able to 
come to know, in normal circumstances, that one is presently looking at one’s children rather 
than extremely life-like robots. The thought was that given the excellent background 
evidence one possesses which indicates that the error-possibility in question is so remote as 
to be discountable, it follows that one is in a position to rationally dismiss this error-
possibility and thereby have adequate grounds to support one’s knowledge that one is 
presently looking at one’s children rather than extremely life-like robots. Crucially, however, 
it was pointed out that knowledge of this sort can be possessedand, indeed, will usually be 
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possessedeven though one is unable to discriminate between one’s children and extremely 
life-like robots.  
The relevance of this example for our present discussion is that an agent who knows, 
on this evidential basis, that she is not presently looking at extremely life-like robots which 
are masquerading as her children surely does exhibit a cognitive achievement. While it is 
undeniable that her cognitive success is not because of the operation of her relevant 
discriminative abilities, that doesn’t undermine the fact that the truth of her belief (that she is 
not presently looking at extremely life-like robots) does seem to be because of her cognitive 
ability more generally. After all, she has weighed-up the evidence available to her in order to 
form an informed judgement on the matter. If this is right, however, then one might naturally 
wonder why a Moorean response to the sceptical problem which allowed our knowledge of 
the denials of sceptical hypotheses to be supported by adequate evidence could not similarly 
argue that such knowledge also involves a cognitive achievement.   
There is, however, a crucial disanalogy between the two cases, and this is that the 
agent in the ‘robot’ case, while lacking the relevant discriminatory capacities, is nevertheless 
able to rationally adduce independent grounds in favour of her belief. Such independent 
grounds are not, however, rationally available to the agent in the sceptical case, even 
assuming a robust form of Mooreanism.  
In the robot case, even though the agent cannot discriminate between the two 
alternative scenarios she is nonetheless able to rationally enhance the epistemic support for 
her belief that the target error possibility does not obtain by reflecting on relevant background 
information that is available to her and which is not itself called into question by that error 
possibility (and which is thus in this sense independent of that error possibility). Indeed, were 
our agent to be unable to rationally adduce independent grounds in favour of her belief, then 
we would not regard her belief as being true because of her cognitive abilities at all, and 
hence we would not regard it as a cognitive achievement. After all, such an agent would be in 
a position of being aware of the target error possibility and believing that it does not obtain, 
and yet regarding herself as lacking any independent rational basis for holding this belief. In 
effect, she would simply be groundlessly trusting that she is in the kind of epistemically 
friendly environment that she takes herself to be in, but if that’s right then the truth of her 
belief cannot be because of her cognitive abilities. 
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Crucially, in the sceptical case the agent lacks both the discriminatory capacities and 
is unable to undertake the kind of rational process that is possible in the robot case. We have 
already noted that the discriminatory capacities are lacking, so the crux of the matter is the 
unavailability of the relevant rational process. The reason why this is unavailable is that 
sceptical error possibilities by their nature call into question the evidential support one 
possesses for one’s beliefs en masse. Accordingly, there is no rational route by which the 
agent can adduce independent grounds in favour of her belief that she is not the victim of a 
sceptical hypothesis, since whatever background evidence she might appeal to will be itself 
problematized by the sceptical hypothesis.  
From a rational perspective, then, all one can do is simply reflect that so long as one is 
indeed in the normal circumstances that one takes oneself to be in, then one has excellent 
evidence in support of one’s belief that one is not a victim of a sceptical hypothesis. But that 
is just to grant that whether or not one’s belief in this regard is true is to a substantive degree 
down to the good fortune of being in an epistemically friendly environment rather than being 
due to one’s own cognitive ability. In effect, one’s epistemic position is akin to that of the 
agent in the robot case who is aware of a certain error possibility but who is unable to 
rationally form a judgment as to why she is entitled to dismiss it. Just as this agent’s true 
belief that she is not a victim of this error possibility does not constitute a cognitive 
achievement, neither does one’s true belief that one is not the victim of a sceptical 
hypothesis.  
So in order to exhibit a cognitive achievement, one must either appropriately exercise 
one’s discriminative capacities or else be in a position to rationally adduce independent 
grounds in favour of what one’s believes in order to compensate for the lack of such 
discriminatory capacities. Since one is unable to meet either condition when it comes to one’s 
belief that one is not the victim of a sceptical hypothesis, it follows that such a belief, when 
true, does not constitute a cognitive achievement. So even if the Moorean is right that one can 
know such propositions, it does not follow that one can have knowledge+ of them, and hence 
(S1+) is on strong ground. 
 
 
8. Still, one might argue that even though one’s knowledge that one is not the victim of a 
sceptical hypothesis does not involve a cognitive achievement, it doesn’t follow that one’s 
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knowledge of E-type propositions also doesn’t involve a cognitive achievement. Couldn’t it 
be the case that the cognitive success involved in the latter case does constitute a cognitive 
achievement, even though the cognitive success in the former case doesn’t? In effect, the 
point in play here is that it is (S2+) that is the contentious premise in the reformulated 
sceptical argument. 
 One could regard (S2+) as being motivated by a sister principle to the closure 
principle that motivated (S2) which explicitly focuses on knowledge+: 
 
The Closure Principle for Knowledge+ 
If S knows+ that p, and S competently deduces q from p (thereby coming to believe q while retaining 
her knowledge+ that p), then S knows+ that q. 
 
With this principle in play, it would not be hard to make a strong case for (S2+). Moreover, 
there does seem to be a great deal of intuitive support for such a principle. After all, if the 
truth of one’s belief in a (known) proposition is because of one’s cognitive ability, and so 
constitutes a cognitive achievement, then it is hard to see why any further knowledge which 
one competently deduces from that knowledge should involve a belief the truth of which is 
related to one’s cognitive ability to any lesser degree. Indeed, if anything, shouldn’t the 
presence of the competent deduction actually enhance the extent to which the truth of one’s 
belief is creditable to one’s own cognitive abilities? 
 One might think that one could adapt the robot case to generate a counterexample to 
this principle. Suppose, for example, that at time t1 our hero knows+ that the persons before 
her are her children. Suppose now, however, that, at t2, she becomes aware of the error 
possibility that she might instead be looking at extremely life-like robots and that she lacks 
the background information that would enable her to rationally adduce independent grounds 
in favour of her belief in the denial of this error possibility. Nevertheless, she does recognise 
that this error possibility is inconsistent with something that she believes (indeed knows+), 
and so she competently deduces on this basis that this error possibility is false. Given what 
we have said earlier, while she might come to know the denial of the error possibility on this 
basis, she cannot come to know+ this proposition because her true belief would not constitute 
a cognitive achievement. Given that by hypothesis she does know+ the antecedent 
proposition, however, then it seems we have a counterexample to the closure principle for 
knowledge+. 
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 On closer inspection, however, such a putative counterexample fails to convince. 
After all, if we really are to suppose that the agent is unable to rationally adduce independent 
grounds in support of her belief in the denial of the error possibility, then why would we 
continue grant that she has knowledge+ of the antecedent proposition? Indeed, wouldn’t the 
fact that someone was struck dumb by the presentation of an error possibility of this sort 
indicate that their knowledge of the antecedent proposition (insofar as we continue to grant 
that they do have knowledge of this proposition) is far more ‘brute’ than it first appeared? 
(It’s not as if such independent grounds are hard to come by, after all).  
 With this point in mind, there is a lot of prima facie support for the knowledge+ 
closure principle. The problem, of course, is that with a closure principle of this sort in play, 
then (S2+) immediately follows. Moreover, since we have already noted that there is a strong 
case in favour of (S1+), then the sceptical conclusion, (SC+), also follows.  
 
 
9. No doubt there will be moves available to the anti-sceptic in this respect; the point of this 
paper has not been to supply a definitive basis for a new form of scepticism but rather to 
demonstrate that viewing the problem of scepticism through the lens of epistemic value 
highlights a very different sceptical challenge that needs responding toviz., that while we 
might well have much of the knowledge that we typically suppose ourselves to have, the type 
of knowledge that we possess may not be of the specially valuable variety. Perhaps this is a 
conclusion that we can ultimately grant to the sceptic; granting it certainly won’t be as 
intellectually disastrous as allowing that widespread knowledge is impossible. Nevertheless, 
it is clearly a conclusion that is, to say the least, uncomfortable. By definition, if the sceptic 
deprives us of something that is of special value to us, then that is something that should 
concern us.19 
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NOTES 
 
1  For further discussion of this template radical sceptical argument, and its role in contemporary epistemology, 
see Pritchard (2002a). For a critical discussion of whether the sceptical argument is best expressed in this 
fashion, see Pritchard (2005b). 
2  This formulation of the closure principle is essentially that offered by Williamson (2000, 117) and Hawthorne 
(2005, 29).  
3  For a recent discussion of the status of the closure principle, see the exchange between Dretske (2005a; 
2005b) and Hawthorne (2005). 
4  One complication in this regard is the contrastivist approach as defended, for example, by Schaffer (2005). 
According to this proposal, there is no such thing as knowing a proposition simpliciter; rather, all knowledge is 
to be understood as relative to a specific set of contrasts (i.e., not-p propositions), and this has important 
ramifications for how one should understand the sceptical argument. I have not the space to explore the 
contrastivist response to radical scepticism here. For further discussion, see Pritchard (2007b).  
5  Even though, depending on the details of the specific rendering of the view in question, the position may not 
in practice resemble G. E. Moore’s own response to the sceptic very much at all. 
6  See, for example, Wright (e.g., 2004) for an anti-sceptical proposal which is cast along these lines. 
7  This would be one way of reading the brand of anti-scepticism propounded by McDowell (e.g., 1995), for 
example, although it is debatable whether McDowell himself would ever put the point in quite these terms. See 
Pritchard (2008c) for further discussion of this reading. See also Williamson (2000, ch. 8). 
8  The kind of contextualism that I have in mind here is attributer contextualism, of the sort defended by, for 
example, DeRose (1995), Lewis (1996) and Cohen (2000). Other types of view could also be understood as 
aiming to accommodate sceptical intuitions along broadly contextualist lines, however, such as a subject 
contextualism of the sort defended (under a very different name) by Hawthorne (2004) and Stanley (2005). 
9  I expand on this point, and its epistemological ramifications, in Pritchard (2008b).  
10  I develop this line of argument in more detail in Pritchard (2008d, §1). For more on the general issues 
surrounding the value of knowledge, see Kvanvig (2003) and Pritchard (2007c; 2007d).  
11  Greco, like other virtue epistemologists who have pursued this general line, actually argues that knowledge is 
intrinsically valuable rather than finally valuable (e.g., Greco forthcominga, §4). It is clear from what he says 
about the value of knowledge, however, that it is specifically final value that he has in mind, and so this is how I 
have expressed his view here. 
12  See also Sosa (1988; 1991; 2007) and Zagzebski (e.g., 1996; 1999) for virtue-theoretic accounts of 
knowledge that are cast along roughly these lines. 
13  This example is due to Chisholm (1977, 105). 
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14  A second way of defending the final value thesis against this line of objection is to opt for a kind of holism 
about value. Just as one might hold that pain is the sort of thing which is generally bad but sometimes good, so 
one might argue that knowledge is the kind of thing which is generally finally valuable but sometimese.g., 
where the cognitive success in question is trivial etc.,not finally valuable. The reason why such an approach 
might work is that all the virtue-theoretic account of the value of knowledge is aiming to account for is why 
knowledge is distinctively valuable in the way that we think it is, and demonstrating that it is generally finally 
valuable would probably suffice in this regard (at least so long as there is no lesser epistemic standing which is 
also generally finally valuable). I am grateful to Mike Ridge for this suggestion. For further discussion of what 
is required of an adequate account of the distinctive value of knowledge, see Pritchard (2007c; 2007d; 2008d).   
15  I describe some of the moves that Greco makes in the light of this line of objection and evaluate their merits 
in Pritchard (2007e; 2008d; forthcoming).  
16  In particular, I argue elsewhere that considerations like this point towards what I term an ‘anti-luck virtue 
epistemology’. I expand on what such a view involves in Pritchard (2008a; 2008d). Interestingly, although this 
view is motivated in a very different way, such a proposal is very close in spirit to the sort of view that Greco 
defended in earlier work, and abandoned in favour of the more robust virtue-theoretic proposal discussed here. 
See, for example, Greco (1999; 2000).  
17  In particular, the belief would be ‘safe’. For more on safety and the extent to which it captures the ‘anti-luck’ 
requirement on knowledge, see Sosa (1999) and Pritchard (2002b; 2005a; 2007a). 
18  Recall that for the purposes of this example we were setting sceptical worries to one side. 
19  I am grateful to Adam Carter and John Turri for detailed comments on an earlier version of this paper. 
Thanks also to Jennifer Lackey and Mike Ridge. 
